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Introduction
How does war shape post-war politics? 
When is electoral competition in post-
war societies determined by the war 
past, and when is it determined by the 
peacetime present and future? What 
are the conditions under which war 
becomes an integral part of post-war 
political narratives, practices, and insti-
tutions? Post-war elections have attra-
cted great interest from political scien-
tists. That interest, however, has been 
primarily focused on the connection 
between electoral democratization and 
conflict. Voters' and political entrepre-
neurs' interests and electoral behaviour 
after the initial, temporally very limited, 
post-conflict period have remained lar-
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gely neglected by researchers, even tho-
ugh the effects of war reverberate long 
after the end of hostilities. War changes 
people and their communities. It forges 
distinct social groups bounded by their 
diverse and traumatic war experiences 
of migration, loss, illness, and death. It 
destroys polities' fabrics of mutual un-
derstanding and tolerance. And yet we 
have little systematic and theoretically 
advanced understanding of its impact 
on the nature and content of post-war 
political competition.
Systematising and theorising the 
study of post-war politics is, of course, 
a difficult task exactly because wars have 
such complex effects on both individu-
als and societies. In fact, even capturing 
the essence of those effects has proven 
to be a substantial challenge in the field, 
with significant differences in approa-
ch among scholars, at times guided by 
the lack of available data and at times 
by unclear methodological aims. Some 
authors have, for example, focused on 
individuals' personal experiences of 
combat or the feelings of trauma. Ot-
hers have focused on the contextual or 
social experiences of exposure to violen-
ce. These different approaches have un-
surprisingly led to often conflicting fin-
dings and limited theoretical advance-
ments. This article presents our attempt 
at classifying the different approaches in 
the literature toward modelling the lega-
cies of war, with the goal of advancing 
our understanding of the wars' impa-
ct on post-war politics. We centre our 
attention on studies utilising quantitati-
ve methods with relatively large samples 
and focusing on countries which have 
experienced conflict of a significant ma-
gnitude – regardless whether civil or in-
ternational – and which have embraced 
some form of democratic competition 
in the post-war period. Our focus on 
quantitative, large-N studies is not gro-
unded in the belief that this kind of re-
search is empirically more valuable, but 
simply in the fact that this is the kind of 
research we do. Our choice inherently 
limits the reach of our review, though 
we would argue that it also improves its 
analytical clarity. We organise our dis-
cussion around three levels of analysis: 
individual level of voters, institutional 
level of political parties, and the aggre-
gate level of communities.1
With this review article, we aim not 
only to identify the principal ways in 
which political scientists have tried to 
capture the impact of war on post-war 
politics, but also to offer our understan-
ding of which approaches may provide 
the most fruitful way forward, particu-
larly when it comes to the study of the 
political legacies of war in contempo-
rary Southeast Europe. In our view, So-
utheast Europe offers the best opportu-
nities for the comparative study of the 
effects of wars of different type (civil 
wars, wars of aggression, international 
interventions), outcome (defeat, victory, 
and stalemate), and character (ranging 
from lengthy skirmishes of low intensity 
to genocide) on the nature of post-war 
political competition. Our hope is that 
this contribution sparks interest among 
scholars of the region for the disciplined 
and methodologically advanced study 
of the concepts and dynamics we write 
about. The account we present here is by 
no means comprehensive, but rather a 
cross-section of the literature we believe 
has the greatest potential for the setting 
of the foundations of a promising rese-
arch programme. In the sections that 
follow, we deal with each of the three le-
vels of analysis in turn. The first section 
1 These three levels of analysis also form 
the three distinct, though closely related, 
segments of our 5-year research project 
funded by the European Research Council 
Starting Grant No. 714589, titled "Electoral 
Legacies of War: Political Competition in 
Post-war Southeast Europe" (ELWar) and 
hosted by the University of Luxembourg.
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reviews the key findings in the literature 
on the voter-level effects of war and ar-
gues that the direction of future research 
should take into consideration in other 
social sciences, particularly in the eco-
nomic psychology of risk formation. 
The second section reviews the relative-
ly under-developed literature using qu-
antitative methods in the study of post-
war political parties. It argues strongly 
for the implementation of automated or 
computer assisted analyses of political 
text as the best way forward in analysing 
the effects of war on the behaviour of 
political parties and political entrepre-
neurs. Finally, the third section, dealing 
with the community-level effects of war, 
complements its literature review with a 
broader discussion about the practicali-
ties of doing that kind of research in So-
utheast Europe.
Voters' war experiences: 
Combatants, civilians, 
and war trauma
A large body of literature is devoted to 
the impact of war experiences and war 
trauma on the lives of affected military 
personnel and civilians. Most of these 
studies, however, focus on stress and 
other psychological symptoms expe-
rienced by the individuals exposed to 
war violence. Relatively few authors 
address how individual war experiences 
and war trauma actually affect political 
behaviour. Our understanding of how 
exposure to various forms of war vio-
lence fits into the reality of voter choice 
is, therefore, limited and fragmentary at 
best. A perfect testament of this tenden-
cy can be observed in a recent review 
of the greatest advances in the study of 
various forms (i.e. not just economic) of 
retrospective voting in which war recei-
ved just one short paragraph (Healy and 
Malhotra 2013: 295). The focus of this 
section of our article is exactly on the 
studies which connect war experiences 
and political behaviour – how they con-
ceptualise and operationalise individual 
war experiences, and the consequences 
this has on their capacity to explain par-
ticular individual-level political beha-
viours. It is important to note that the 
overwhelming majority of the works de-
aling with these questions are founded 
upon analyses of various forms of public 
opinion surveys, with only a handful of 
studies employing (quasi)experimental 
designs with very limited analytical re-
ach. The causal argumentation they pre-
sent, therefore, needs to be considered 
rather cautiously.
In terms of measuring individual-le-
vel war experiences, the main distincti-
on in the literature seems to be between 
the focus on the experiences of former 
combatants who actively fought or par-
ticipated in the conflict and the focus on 
the experiences of civilians who were 
more or less unwillingly exposed to the 
conflict. The experiences of the latter 
group could be further subdivided into 
those which were personally or directly 
experienced, and those which happened 
to someone close like a friend or family 
member and were therefore experienced 
only indirectly. What exactly is measu-
red in each of these types of war expe-
riences varies substantially between stu-
dies. In samples with both veterans and 
non-veterans, one of the most common 
ways to distinguish between the two has 
been via a simple binary variable, indi-
cating whether individuals served in the 
military or not. This has been a staple of 
research on the veterans of the various 
20th and 21st century wars in the Ame-
rican context (e.g. Jennings and Markus 
1977; Klingler and Chatagnier 2014; 
Teigen 2006, 2007). Since no additional 
information was used in these studies 
to determine whether the respondent 
actually saw combat, however, their abi-
lity to draw conclusions on the relation 
between combat exposure and political 
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behaviour among military personnel 
has been limited. A more fruitful appro-
ach has been used in the studies on the 
consequences of the wars in former Yu-
goslavia, as well as the conflict between 
the Israelis and the Palestinians. Here, 
scholars have usually distinguished ve-
terans from civilians by whether they 
actually fought in the wars (Massey, 
Hodson, and Sekulic 2003; Sandovici 
and Listhaug 2012; Strabac and Ringdal 
2008), with some also employing infor-
mation about the duration of soldiers' 
service in a combat zone (Grossman et 
al. 2015).
When it comes to measuring war 
experiences of civilians, on the other 
hand, the literature has suffered from an 
apparent lack of conceptual and theore-
tical clarity in three different, but clo-
sely related, ways. First, the distinction 
between direct and indirect war expe-
riences has often been blurred. Dyrstad 
(2012, 2013), for example, has measured 
"direct individual exposure", but opera-
tionalised it as whether the respondent 
had a close friend or family member die 
or disappear, which is in fact an indire-
ct war experience. Massey et al. (2003) 
have calculated a war experience index 
based on both personal experiences 
(such as whether one's life was endan-
gered or whether one was wounded) 
and events that happened to friends and 
family members (see also Canetti et al. 
2017; Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009; Hirs-
ch-Hoefler et al. 2016). Moreover, they 
included a separate measure for having 
been in personal danger during the 
war, which created a conceptual overlap 
between their independent variables. In 
this line of research, arguably only San-
dovici and Listhaug (2012) and Strabac 
and Ringdal (2008) have appropriately 
distinguished between war events expe-
rienced personally and events experien-
ced by someone close to the respondent. 
Both studies concluded that direct and 
indirect experiences of war can have di-
fferent political ramifications (of which 
more below).
Second, many studies have created 
rather simple sum indices of concrete 
war experiences to measure someo-
ne's exposure to war (Blattman 2009; 
Canetti et al. 2017; Canetti-Nisim et 
al. 2009; Massey, Hodson, and Seku-
lic 2003; Solomon and Lavi 2005). The 
main problem with this approach has 
been the qualitative difference between 
those various experiences. For instance, 
in Massey et al. (2003) a family member 
wounded and a family member killed 
were equally valued in the calculation of 
the war experience index. Additionally, 
multiple concrete war experiences such 
as being a refugee, life endangerment or 
starvation might have been related to 
the same event, which may then have 
been counted multiple times. A better 
approach would likely be to focus on 
a limited number of specific experien-
ces and to treat these experiences as 
qualitatively different, or to give certa-
in experiences a larger weight through 
factor analysis (Kijewski and Freitag 
2018).
And third, even when authors have lo-
oked at individuals' veteran status, and 
their direct and indirect war experien-
ces separately, they have always viewed 
the impact of one type of war experien-
ce on political outcomes as independent 
from or simply additional to the impact 
of another war experience. Since these 
experiences are not mutually exclusive, 
it is possible – even likely – that the di-
fferent types of war experiences intera-
ct with one another. For instance, how 
someone's direct war experience, such 
as being a refugee, leads to certain po-
licy preferences could be conditional on 
whether that person also lost a family 
member. In other words, the literature 
lacks theoretical and empirical clarity 
when it comes to the intersectionality of 
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war experiences, i.e. how they moderate 
or amplify the relationship between ot-
her war experiences and political beha-
viour and attitudes.
When it comes to the study of the 
political implications of prior military 
experience, we can say that it has a long 
– though patchy – tradition, particular-
ly in the US context. After WWII, there 
was a concern that the men returning 
from Europe and the Pacific would be 
more authoritarian because of their 
service and combat exposure (Teigen 
2007). Schreiber (1979) investigated this 
question by looking at the difference in 
the survey responses between men who 
served in the military and men who did 
not. He found that veterans, while ha-
ving more positive attitudes toward the 
military, were not more authoritarian 
than non-veterans. His results additio-
nally showed that military service had 
no impact on faith in the government. 
A more thorough and empirically more 
advanced examination was arguably 
performed by Jennings and Markus 
(1977), who conducted a two-wave 
survey of 410 male high school seniors 
between 1965 and 1973. Their study lo-
oked at how service in the Vietnam War 
affected respondents' trust in the gover-
nment. They concluded that while poli-
tical cynicism among Vietnam veterans 
was comparable to that among non-ve-
terans, veterans did have more faith in 
the federal government.
More recently, Klingler and Cha-
tagnier (2014) analysed the survey 
responses of nearly 36 thousand US 
adults and concluded that veterans 
were more right-wing on both eco-
nomic issues such as the minimum 
wage, and social issues such as abor-
tion and immigration. Veterans were 
also found to be more likely to favour 
military action in response to, for in-
stance, efforts to secure oil or protect 
allies. These findings stand in contrast 
to those of Teigen (2007), who used 
a survey of about 1200 US adults to 
look at the party preferences of vete-
rans and non-veterans in the 2004 US 
presidential elections, and found no 
significant difference between the two 
groups. This somewhat surprising fin-
ding could perhaps be explained by 
the existence of a countervailing force, 
namely that the military also places a 
strong emphasis on communitarian 
values, or it could simply be the produ-
ct of the historical juncture the United 
States found itself in at the time of the 
survey, i.e. in the middle of a highly 
unpopular war which was started un-
der false pretences. In his 2006 study, 
however, Teigen did find a significant 
difference between men who had com-
bat experience and those who did not. 
His examination of survey data inclu-
ding more than 635 thousand US adult 
males between 1972 and 2004, found 
that men who served in the military 
were generally more likely to vote, with 
one exception: Vietnam War veterans. 
The design of the study did not give 
many options for causal argumentati-
on, but we can hypothesise that higher 
turnout rates among veterans could be 
due to three reasons: veterans already 
having a strong sense of civic duty pri-
or to joining the military, the military 
instilling civic norms and values in its 
recruits, and the presence of strong ve-
teran interest groups. All these factors, 
of course, falling by the wayside if the 
combat experience is as unpopular and 
ends as ignominiously as was the case 
with the war in Vietnam.
The evidence on the difference 
between the political views and actions 
of veterans and non-veterans outside 
of the US context is also mixed. Gro-
ssman et al. (2015) looked at male sol-
diers who served in the Israeli Defence 
Forces between 1998 and 2003 (rou-
ghly corresponding with the events 
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of the Second Intifada), comparing 
soldiers who had combat exposure 
to soldiers who did not. Their results 
showed that the former were less likely 
to have conciliatory attitudes in favo-
ur of a peaceful settlement of the con-
flict, and were more likely to vote for 
hard-line parties. Contrary to Teigen's 
(2006) findings, Grossman et al. conc-
luded that combat exposure resulted in 
lower levels of political participation 
(though they did not look at voting). In 
studies focusing on the wars in former 
Yugoslavia, studies found no differen-
ce between veterans and non-veterans. 
Support for ethnic nationalism and li-
beralism (Massey, Hodson, and Seku-
lic 2003), ethnic prejudice (Strabac and 
Ringdal 2008), and optimism about the 
future do not seem to depend of having 
fought in the wars (Sandovici and List-
haug 2012).
The study of how the war experiences 
of civilians affect their political beha-
viour and attitudes is similarly incon-
sistent and often contradictory, likely 
dependent on social and historical con-
text, as well as on the different operati-
onalisation of the principal dependent 
variable capturing the legacies of war. 
The main focus of most authors have 
been political attitudes, with only one 
study looking at the relation between 
war experiences and actual political 
behaviour (Blattman 2009), though 
with a highly context-specific set of war 
experiences which dramatically limits 
the study's generalisability. When it 
comes to political attitudes, the picture 
that emerges is rather mixed. Massey 
et al. (2003) found that war experien-
ces in Croatia were positively related 
to ethnic nationalism, but unrelated to 
the support for liberalism. In Kosovo, 
war experiences seem to have reduced 
the trust individuals have in the peo-
ple in their neighbourhoods (Kijewski 
and Freitag 2018). Strabac and Ringdal 
(2008) demonstrated that, while indi-
rect war experiences increased ethnic 
prejudice in Croatia, direct war expe-
riences did not. Sandovici and Listhaug 
(2012) found that in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina direct experiences reduced 
optimism while indirect experiences 
increased it. Dyrstad (2012) looked 
at how indirect war experiences were 
related to ethno-nationalism and au-
thoritarian values in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Croatia, and Kosovo, finding 
that respondents' sense of ethno-nati-
onalism was only affected by exposure 
to war-related violence in Croatia, but 
not in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ko-
sovo. In her 2013 study focused on the 
same countries, Dyrstad also establis-
hed that indirect war experiences lead 
to authoritarian values, though crucia-
lly only if they also resulted in post-tra-
umatic stress disorder (PTSD).
Arguably the most elaborate work 
on the topic of civilian war experiences 
has been done by Canetti-Nisim et al. 
(2009), Canetti et al. (2017), and Hirs-
ch-Hoefler et al. (2016). They developed 
a distress-based model of how war expe-
riences affect attitudes toward peace. 
The model argues that the exposure to 
violence leads to psychological stress, 
which in turn leads to an increased thre-
at perception of the enemy. This results 
in an "ethos of conflict", comprising of 
beliefs related to the justness of goals, 
victimization, security, delegitimization 
of the opponent, patriotism, unity, and 
peace. This ethos of conflict subsequen-
tly shapes political attitudes. The model 
has proven effective in explaining exc-
lusionist attitudes in Israel toward Pale-
stinians (Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009), and 
attitudes toward what a peace settlement 
with the Palestinians should look like 
(Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009; Hirsch-Ho-
efler et al. 2016; also see Solomon and 
Lavi 2005).
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We believe that this line of argumen-
tation offers great promise as it focuses 
on the respondents' actual feelings of 
trauma which are partly dependent on 
war experiences, but partly also on the 
individuals' capability to cope. The grea-
test challenge for future research efforts 
lies in creating a portable theoretical 
grounding which will help us expose the 
mechanisms behind the effects of expo-
sure to different war experiences (and 
the possible cross-generational transfer 
of trauma) on political attitudes. In our 
opinion, one part of the answer could 
be in learning from and applying some 
of the findings in economic psychology, 
namely on the impact of traumatic expe-
riences on risk aversion. Apart from a 
couple of exceptions (Eckel, El-Gamal, 
and Wilson 2009; Voors et al. 2012), 
the near consensus of this literature is 
that traumatic experiences – whether 
it is floods (Cameron and Shah 2015), 
economic depression (Malmendier and 
Nagel 2011), terrorism (Sacco, Galletto, 
and Blanzieri 2003), losing a child (Bu-
cciol and Zarri 2015), or war (Kim and 
Lee 2014) – make people more risk 
averse, possibly even permanently (Ca-
llen et al. 2014). In other words, war-re-
lated trauma could, through higher risk 
aversion, lead to changes in individuals' 
political preference functions when it 
comes to personal as well as economic 
security (Glaurdić and Vuković 2018). 
These changed preference functions wo-
uld in turn, in interaction with the su-
pply of political options specific to the 
social and historical context, lead to the 
observed nature of post-war electoral 
competition.
Of course, there are a number of 
challenges that need to be addressed if 
we are to succeed in exposing this dyna-
mic. Two of them particularly stand out. 
The first challenge is in appropriately 
modelling the legacies of war violen-
ce on the individual level in a uniform 
and broadly applicable way. Guided by 
Canetti-Nisim et al. (2009) and the-
ir finding that it is the feeling of psyc-
hological distress that matters when it 
comes to pinpointing the determinants 
of post-conflict political attitudes, the 
individual voter level section of our 
project which employs public opinion 
surveys, experimental, and quasi-expe-
rimental methods captures trauma exa-
ctly by inquiring about the individuals' 
different dimensions of their possible 
war-related psychological distress. Here 
we follow the scales employed by the 
South East European Social Survey Pro-
ject in order to make our findings com-
parable to the data it collected a decade 
and a half ago (Simkus 2007). The se-
cond challenge in exposing the mecha-
nism connecting war trauma and poli-
tical behaviour lies in designing studies 
which can improve on conventional 
public opinion research when it comes 
to making causal inferences. As stated 
above, studies utilising, for example, 
experimental and quasi-experimental 
designs to deal with the impact of the 
legacies of violence on any kind of poli-
tical behaviour are few and far between 
(e.g. Blattman 2009; Montalvo 2011). 
That is obviously partly due to the natu-
re of the subject matter, but if the field is 
to make significant strides in explaining 
the effects of war legacies on post-war 
voter choice, methodological appro-
aches enabling higher levels of causal 
inference will have to be employed to a 
far greater extent than has been the case 
thus far.
Political parties and war 
legacies: Institutionalising 
past into present
Political parties as key actors of political 
change play an important role in the cre-
ation of sustainable peace, stability, and 
democracy. This claim is true for both 
functioning democracies as well as all 
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other forms of regimes either stable or 
undergoing political or social transfor-
mation (van Biezen 2004; Bille 2001). 
Although political parties have been po-
ssibly the most studied political actors 
for decades, the effects of war or violent 
conflict on their internal organisati-
on, policy preferences, or mobilisation 
efforts have been very rarely addressed 
in any systematic or theoretically infor-
med way. This is surprising since many 
traditional political parties in Europe, 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America were 
forged in or at least affected by violent 
conflict at some point in their history. 
Just as is the case with individuals and 
communities, these experiences are 
uniquely transformative for political 
parties as well. Their effects could be po-
tentially significant years or even deca-
des after the conflict has ended, influen-
cing different dimensions of parties' 
political profile and activities.
Most of the research dealing with war 
legacies in the context of parties focuses 
on the transformation of former rebel 
groups into peacetime political institu-
tions and their adjustment to the new 
democratic arena of competition (e.g. 
Ishiyama 2014; Ishiyama and Mars-
hall 2015; Manning 2008). In fact, reb-
el groups and former fighters are not 
merely the central components of the 
mainstream research approach to the 
study of war legacies and party politics 
– they are a hegemonic one. Although 
the relevant literature addresses a va-
riety of topics such as party organiza-
tion, party leadership, surviving war 
time networks, or party and electoral 
systems, the focus is temporally rather 
narrow, and it often covers only the im-
mediate period of post-conflict negotia-
tions. In this context, political parties or 
their organisational proto-forms (e.g. 
rebel groups, fighters, guerrillas) are 
mostly studied through the four diffe-
rent phases of conflict and peacebuil-
ding they are part of: conflict causation, 
conflict settlement, post-war transition, 
and post-war democratization (Rams-
botham et al. 2016; Zeeuw 2008). With 
this limited timeline of interest, what we 
are missing is an entire body of resear-
ch that should go beyond rebel groups 
and their transformation and should try 
to cover the long-lasting effects of war 
on political parties in a comparative 
perspective. What happens not only to 
rebel groups, but also to "conventional" 
political parties after the war is over? In 
which ways is the legacy of war relevant 
even after the usual phase of post-war 
democratization is finished? How do 
we observe, theorise, and study these 
war legacies? What kind of evidence can 
we collect and analyse in a rigorous and 
comparative fashion?
The existing literature on post-war 
political parties could roughly be divi-
ded into two groups which could best be 
termed structural and functional. The 
structural group covers predominantly 
the structural characteristics of political 
parties and their systems. Typical exam-
ples would be studies of party organi-
sation (Sindre 2016; Reilly 2006), party 
leadership and candidate recruitment 
(Khazen 2003; Lyons 2016; Ishiyama and 
Marshall 2015), various networks of co-
operation (Taleski 2012), the party sys-
tem itself (Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Goeke 
2016), typology and characteristics of 
political parties (Reilly and Nordlund 
2008), electoral system designs and 
their effects on political parties (Reilly 
2008; Ishiyama 2014), or institutional 
restrictions such as party bans imposed 
on political representation (Basedau and 
Moroff 2011). The functional group, on 
the other hand, focuses on the political 
parties' actions and functions. Typical 
examples would be studies of legitimacy 
(Taleski 2012; Lyons 2016), war-related 
policy agenda (Taleski 2012), role of ide-
ology (Whiting 2016; Gadjanova 2015), 
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or effects of foreign aid (Marshall 2017; 
Nenadović 2010). This division should 
not be understood as rigid, since none 
of the referenced works focuses on one 
issue only. However, what virtually all of 
them have in common is their focus on 
the immediate aftermath of armed con-
flict, as well as their focus on the tran-
sformation of former fighting groups 
into political parties.
These works also have much in com-
mon when it comes to their methodo-
logical approaches. Most published 
research centres either on one case or 
on a small number of cases which are 
examined mostly through qualitative 
empirical strategies like oral histories or 
in-depth archival and historical research 
(Reilly 2001; Sindre 2016). Only a hand-
ful of studies have approached the anal-
ysis of political parties in post-conflict 
environments from a medium- or lar-
ge-N quantitative perspective. Manning 
and Smith (2016) use a sample of 65 
post-conflict settlements to test what 
the conditions are under which rebel 
groups successfully incorporate into de-
mocratic politics when civil wars end. 
Ishiyama (2014) uses a sample of 92 
countries with civil war experience to 
study the effects of conflict on the chara-
cteristics of post-conflict party systems 
and their stability. Marshall (2017) uses 
a sample of 112 rebel parties to test their 
long-term viability in post-conflict ele-
ctions following negotiated settlements. 
Ishiyama and Marshall (2015) build a 
unique dataset of electoral candidates in 
post-conflict Nepal to examine the re-
cruitment and nomination strategies of 
former rebel groups. The same authors 
in their 2016 study use a sample of 69 
post-conflict settlements to test whether 
the transformation of rebel groups into 
political parties leads to the develop-
ment of a durable peace after a civil war. 
Most recently, Matanock (2018) uses 
a sample of 122 dyadic settlements to 
study under what conditions civil confli-
ct settlements bring former combatants 
into normal politics as political parties.
As can be seen from this overview, 
the current stream of literature provides 
a rather limited scope of attention that 
omits a big part of potential empirical 
evidence on the legacies of war and their 
relevance for political parties. The lega-
cies of war in parties' platforms, orga-
nisations, or mobilisation strategies are 
arguably not directly modelled at all but 
are rather asserted in a binary fashion 
depending on their potential status as 
former rebel groups. However, almost all 
"old" or "traditional" parties in Western 
Europe, not to mention most political 
parties in Southeast Europe, have been 
massively affected by war at some point 
of their evolution and development, and 
some of those effects reverberate in the 
lives of these parties to this day. The lite-
rature's existing focus on political par-
ties in immediate post-conflict settings 
does not provide much guidance for 
studying those more long-lasting war 
legacies. Although partial inspiration 
can be found in the extensive literatu-
re on political parties in consolidated 
democracies (Katz and Crotty 2014; 
Hershey 2017) or in the research con-
cerning general historical legacies and 
political parties (Crawford and Lijphart 
1995; Mair 2004), the fact remains that a 
whole branch of research on the effects 
of war on post-conflict political parties 
still needs to be established. In terms of 
the previously presented timeline with 
the four phases of conflict causation, 
conflict settlement, post-war transition, 
and post-war democratization, we can 
say that a study of the fifth phase which 
could be defined as post-war consolida-
tion and routinization of party politics 
needs to be created.
We propose that this need can be sys-
tematically best addressed by utilising 
automated or computer assisted analyses 
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of political text based on modern tools 
of natural language processing (NLP). 
Since we believe that the legacies of war 
reverberate through party politics for a 
long time after the conflict has ended, 
our overall goal should be to find out 
what role the war past plays in everyday 
politics and how it evolves over time. In 
this context, the view of political parties 
as uniform institutions that interact with 
each other in the political arena should 
be eschewed. Instead, political parties in 
their traditional sense should be decon-
structed and analysed as platforms of 
organised individuals who reveal their 
preferences and positions on an every-
day basis and who define what party 
politics means (Krehbiel 1993; Itzkovit-
ch-Malka and Hazan 2017; Dewan and 
Squintani 2016). To be more precise, we 
should particularly be interested in who 
talks about the war past (or war-related 
present and future!), how, when, and to 
which audiences. The primary source 
of data in this context is raw text, often 
a piece of writing or a transcript of the 
spoken word that is cleaned, analysed, 
and interpreted. Our societies produce 
mountains of texts that are political in 
nature on a daily basis which have been 
virtually impossible to process systema-
tically by an individual or a small group 
of collaborators through what is known 
as close reading. Recent technological 
and theoretical advances in computa-
tional content analysis, however, have 
changed that dramatically.
The application of natural language 
processing tools to the study of war and 
war-related issues has so far been very 
limited and almost exclusively focused 
on political debates in the United Sta-
tes (e.g. Kriner and Shen 2014; Schon-
hardt-Bailey 2005). More generally, this 
approach is penetrating mainstream 
political science only slowly, mostly in 
the studies of parliamentary and cam-
paign speeches, media discourse, and 
social networks (Baturo, Dasandi, and 
Mikhaylov 2017; Crowley, Watson, and 
Waller 2008; Proksch and Slapin 2015). 
However, the available tools are not re-
served solely to these domains and co-
uld be applied to all sorts of social scien-
ce problems and sources. News articles, 
debate transcripts, political blogs, media 
reports, social media posts and tweets 
are all unique and invaluable sources of 
information that can – thanks to new 
software and hardware advances – be 
processed and analysed in a variety of 
languages, including the languages of 
Southeast Europe. This presents a tre-
mendous opportunity to address the 
most difficult challenges of collecting 
data on political parties in a more syste-
matic and unbiased way.
In this context, the text as data appro-
ach is a key strategy for the study of 
political parties in Southeast Europe 
dictating what data need to be colle-
cted and how they can be analysed. In 
ELWar we focus our attention primarily 
on the evolution of war-related political 
discourse in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, and Serbia, and we try to un-
derstand what role war continues to play 
in the political lives of these countries – 
how it is used and abused by political 
entrepreneurs and their followers in 
political arenas and in their daily intera-
ctions with the world around them. We 
have, for example, collected transcripts 
of debates in each of the national parlia-
ments of our interest for at least 15 ye-
ars of their post-conflict existence using 
various scraping and cleaning tools we 
developed ourselves on top of available 
programming packages. The result is a 
set of three corpora for the three parlia-
ments that were further populated with 
meta-information identifying speakers, 
their personal characteristics (including 
their war pasts), and policy agendas on 
the level of single speeches. This gives 
us a massive source of information on 
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political preferences and positions of 
individual MPs and, when aggregated, 
whole political parties. This approach – 
paired with our analyses of other forms 
of public discourse in both conventional 
and social media – goes far beyond the 
mainstream studies of party manifestos, 
official party documents, and positions 
of the most prominent political figures 
which we also utilise. In other words, 
we cover the entire political spectrum 
of discourse and debate in the period of 
more than a decade and a half in coun-
tries with very similar, yet different, war 
histories and war legacies.
The study of war legacies in this con-
text represents a unique opportunity 
where a number of NLP tools can be 
applied. Through these tools we can, for 
example, trace the development of to-
pics we are interested in (counting and 
weighting of n-grams), properly identify 
and label these topics (topic-modelling), 
scale the evidence on a single (Wordfi-
sh) or multiple scales (Wordscores), un-
derstand the contexts in which certain – 
particularly war-past-related – concepts 
occur (keywords in context, LSI mo-
dels, word2vec models), detect actors, 
organizations, or places (named entity 
recognition), understand the semantic 
structure of a written and/or spoken text 
(semantic network analysis), measure 
sentiment (sentiment analysis), or ulti-
mately build complex machine-learning 
algorithms based on neural networks 
in order to get closer to a state where 
computer programs can read and un-
derstand natural language for us. This is 
just a fraction of opportunities we have 
at hand that can be used for the study 
not just of war legacies, but also all other 
relevant issues in political science.
This approach is however not the 
only strategy how political parties in 
post-conflict societies can and should 
be studied. The body of literature on 
political parties, their leadership, stru-
ctures, and mechanisms of mobilisation 
is a fruitful source of inspiration which 
should be built upon and expanded. 
Text as data approach should therefore 
be combined with more conventional 
strategies in order to provide a broa-
der scope for studying party politics. In 
the fall of 2018, we launched what will 
be an annual expert survey focusing 
on party positions in Southeast Europe 
which expands on the existing datasets 
on party positions and preferences like 
the Manifesto Project or the Chapel Hill 
Expert Survey (CHESDATA 2018; Leh-
mann et al. 2017) by including questions 
on the parties' attitudes toward the war 
past. For illustrative purposes, our Fig-
ure 1 shows the opinions of the experts 
we surveyed on the Croatian parties' 
left-right placement and their attitudes 
toward acknowledging harmful acts 
committed against other ethnic groups 
during Croatia's war for independence 
(Lesschaeve and Glaurdić, 2018). As is 
immediately apparent, this issue is per-
ceived to be at the core of the ideological 
divide on Croatia's party scene.
The study of political parties has 
always been challenging, since access 
to politicians, their preferences, as well 
as many of their actions, has been limi-
ted. Text as data approach and the NLP 
tools of computational content analysis 
represent a solid strategy of collecting 
and processing relatively unbiased data. 
This approach and the tools it is built 
upon are by no means without shortco-
ming, but recent years have shown how 
powerful they can be if designed and 
utilised properly. The latest advances of 
multinational tech companies continue 
to show us the future of the industry and 
the future of our understanding of social 
as well as political interactions. Machine 
and deep learning, neural networks, and 
super computers are already affecting 
our lives tremendously. We believe they 
could also help transform how we as po-
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litical scientists understand the ways in 
which polities absorb the (war) past and 
turn it into (electoral) present.
The social dimension of war 
legacies: Communities and 
experiences of violence
Wars are, by their very nature, une-
venly distributed social events. The-
ir consequences are embedded in the 
particular context of space and time 
where and when different forms of vi-
olence take place. Individual-level data 
can only go so far in capturing this so-
cial nature of war and its legacies. If we 
are to understand the full nature of the 
consequences of war violence, we have 
to capture their essence in the pattern 
of their geographic distribution and 
temporal evolution. This approach, as 
anything in social sciences, has its tra-
de-offs. On the one hand, researchers 
must be cognisant of the pitfalls of eco-
logical fallacy and must be careful not 
to extrapolate aggregate-level findings 
onto the individual level. Aggregate-le-
vel data is primarily useful when expla-
ining aggregate-level phenomena. On 
the other hand, however, the quality of 
available aggregate-level data – particu-
larly in more recent post-conflict socie-
ties – frequently surpasses the quality of 
individual-level survey data. The poten-
tially fatal problems with sampling and 
self-reporting biases in public opinion 
surveys in post-conflict societies can be 
circumvented with quality aggregate-le-
vel data. The challenge is, of course, in 
finding such data on the level of mea-
ningful sub-national or national com-
munities – settlements, villages, cities, 
municipalities, regions, states, or any ot-
her geographically clearly defined areas. 
This often entails a painstaking combi-
nation of archival work as well as data 
collection, clean-up, and analysis, which 
takes time and requires a diverse met-
hodological toolbox. We believe, howe-
ver, that the potential benefits could be 
enormous, as this research has the capa-
city to dramatically alter the direction of 
our discipline.
Figure 1. Attitudes of Croatian parties toward the war past, 2018 expert survey resultsFigure 1. ti   ar  t e ar ast, 2018 expert survey results 
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Modelling the effects of war and de-
struction on some form of aggregate le-
vel has presented a substantial challenge 
for scholars in a variety of fields beyond 
political science: from geography throu-
gh sociology to economics. This challen-
ge has been answered with an increasing 
level of innovation due to the availability 
of newer forms of data and data colle-
ction methods, such as satellite imaging 
(e.g. Witmer and O'Loughlin 2009). In 
development and urban economics, the 
focus has largely been on the destructi-
on of physical and human capital. Davis 
and Weinstein (2002), for example, have 
studied the effects of Allied bombing on 
Japanese city growth after WWII and 
Brakman et al. (2004) largely replicated 
their study in the case of Germany. Both 
studies modelled the effects of Allied 
bombing using local estimates from the 
immediate post-war period regarding 
the destruction of housing stock and 
the number of casualties, and they both 
found the effects on city growth to have 
been only temporary at best. Miguel and 
Roland (2011), on the other hand, used 
US Air Force bombing intensity data 
on the level of Vietnamese districts and 
reached a similar conclusion, namely 
that physical destruction had no effect 
on post-war economic development of 
Vietnam. Vonyó (2012) also used the 
German WWII housing stock destru-
ction figures and complemented them 
with the figures for German expellees 
from various East European lands in his 
study of the dislocation of the post-war 
West German economy and the effect of 
the drastic labour expansion on the ru-
ral economy. The debate on the compa-
rative effects of physical versus human 
capital destruction was addressed in 
arguably the most innovative way by Fa-
bian Waldinger in his 2016 study of the 
impact of Allied bombing and the Nazi 
dismissal of scientists on the producti-
vity of German universities. Echoing 
the findings from other studies, human 
capital costs proved to have much larger 
negative effects on scientific output than 
physical capital losses.
When it comes to political science, we 
can say that aggregate-level data captu-
ring the effects of war have been used 
primarily for two purposes: as higher-le-
vel controls in individual-level public 
opinion or experimental studies, or as 
more or less principal explanatory va-
riables in studies where the dependent 
variables are also modelled on the aggre-
gate-level. The use of aggregate-level 
data to capture contextual information 
regarding the possible effects of war has 
been a staple of individual-level public 
opinion research in political science for 
some time. Most often the data being 
used have been either binary variables 
or national-level casualty statistics in 
large pooled survey datasets. For exam-
ple, Kostadinova (2000) used a series of 
simple binary variables to model Central 
and East European countries' World War 
II and Soviet-era pasts to explain the di-
fferences in individual respondents' su-
pport for NATO membership. Gabel and 
Palmer (1995) and Gabel and Whitten 
(1997) used national-level World War II 
casualty figures in pooled Eurobarome-
ter surveys to expose the sources of diffe-
rence among respondents when it came 
to their support for European integrati-
on. And, similarly, Allam and Goerres 
(2011) used those same casualty figures 
to explain the differences in support for 
the Euro among respondents from Cen-
tral and East European countries. Intere-
stingly, the conclusion of all these studies 
has invariably been that respondents co-
ming from countries with stronger lega-
cies of violent conflict were more likely 
to support various forms of European in-
tegration, suggesting that the memories 
of conflict are crucial for the continued 
support of the European project. Outsi-
de of the European context, the use of 
aggregate-level contextual data in public 
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opinion and experimental research has 
largely focused on the United States with 
its excellent county-level and congressio-
nal district-level data on casualties in the 
wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. 
The dependent variables of interest have 
usually been levels of support for the war 
effort or the levels of support for the in-
cumbent administration responsible for 
the war operations (Althaus et al. 2012; 
Gartner et al. 1997; Kriner and Shen 
2012), with the general conclusion that 
local losses matter more than national, 
and that incumbents' votes are negatively 
affected by higher casualty figures.
Political science research projects mo-
delling the effects of war on the aggrega-
te level and at the same time attempting 
to explain aggregate-level phenomena 
have focused their attention on similar 
issues, such as incumbency in the US 
context (Carson et al. 2001; Karol and 
Miguel 2007; Kriner and Shen 2007) or 
support for European integration in the 
post-communist context (Glaurdić and 
Vuković 2015). They have also, however, 
expanded the reach of our understan-
ding of the political legacies of conflict 
by shedding light on deep, historica-
lly-rooted, political developments of al-
most cleavage-like character. Three pro-
jects are notable in this regard. Glaurdić 
and Vuković in their 2016 study track 
the evolution of the pattern of electoral 
results in the two decades after Croatia's 
war for independence. They find that 
the exposure of the local communities 
to war violence (proxied by the census 
figures for disabilities caused by the war) 
remains the strongest and most stable 
predictor of electoral fortunes, with 
the areas more exposed to war violence 
disproportionately supporting the cen-
tre-right Croatian Democratic Union 
(HDZ) which led the country into and 
throughout the war. Hadzic et al. (2017) 
find something similar in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. They use a more complex 
battery of measures of the effects of war 
by looking at casualties, refugees, loca-
tions of wartime prison camps, and the 
estimates of physical destruction on 
municipal level, and they find all these 
measures to be solid predictors of the 
electoral support for ethnic parties in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina even two deca-
des after the war had ended. Finally, Ro-
zenas et al. (2017) expand the time-fra-
me even further by using archival sour-
ces on Stalin's purges of the Ukrainians 
in the 1940s to show that the pattern of 
these purges determines the pattern of 
electoral support for pro-Russian and 
anti-Russian forces in Western Ukraine 
to this day.
This research holds great promise as 
it could provide a necessary revision of 
our understanding of such critical poli-
tical phenomena as party mobilisation, 
political uses of historical memory, and 
cleavage formation. For example, the 
canonical work of Lipset and Rokkan 
(1967) on cleavage structures, party 
systems, and voter alignments that has 
influenced generations of researchers 
in comparative politics makes little 
mention of war as a phenomenon of 
any real impact on the nature of post-
war political competition. This relu-
ctance to consider war – particularly 
war of such monumental proportions 
as World War II – as an independent 
factor of influence on the formation 
of political cleavages, party systems, 
and voter alignments was carried over 
into the work of many who followed in 
Lipset and Rokkan's footsteps. From 
research on post-World War II West 
European polities (e.g. Barnes 1967; 
Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt 1981; 
Mair 1990) to research on post-com-
munist Eastern Europe (e.g. Kitschelt et 
al. 1999; Tworzecki 2003; Tucker 2006; 
Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009), 
the vast disparities in war experiences 
of individuals, communities, and po-
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litical organisations seldom featured 
as a variable of any meaningful impa-
ct on the nature and content of politi-
cal competition, let alone as a politi-
cal phenomenon meriting systematic 
theoretical and practical explanation. 
Aggregate-level research on the politi-
cal legacies of war therefore has the po-
tential of offering a welcome correction 
to some of the most long-standing and 
broadly held views in our discipline. It 
must be noted, however, that there are 
also important barriers to success.
Most obviously, there is the problem 
of data availability. Capturing the effects 
of war on spaces and communities is a 
complex matter, but we can identify five 
broad groups of data that could – taken 
together – get close to fulfilling the task: 
1) data on military and civilian deaths, 
2) epidemiological data on military and 
civilian injuries and illnesses, 3) popu-
lation displacement data, 4) data on ve-
teran status and various forms of post-
war social benefits, and 5) estimates of 
destruction of physical capital. A limited 
number of conflicts generate solid data 
in any, let alone all five, of these groups. 
Even when they do, a diverse set of mul-
tidisciplinary skills is needed in order to 
properly execute appropriate empirical 
strategies. As already noted, a historian's 
or ethnographer's deep understanding 
of the dynamics of the conflict and the 
post-conflict period needs to be paired 
up with an economist's or statistician's 
understanding of different methodolo-
gical techniques. One recent example 
will perhaps demonstrate that this is 
not easy even in very competent teams 
which produce highly-cited research in 
the best journals. Adena et al. (2015) 
in their excellent study of the impact 
of exposure to radio broadcasts on the 
spread of Nazi support in Weimar Ger-
many use the figures on county-level su-
pplementary assistance for World War I 
veterans as a proxy for the actual num-
ber of "World War I participants" in each 
county. They do that although these fi-
gures represent merely ad hoc financial 
transfers by the county authorities in 
one year (1929), which were furthermo-
re not subject to national-level legislati-
on, but instead dependent on the health 
of the local authorities' budgets. Many 
cash-strapped counties thus provided 
no supplementary assistance whatso-
ever, which in Adena et al.'s interpre-
tation would mean that these counties 
had no World War I "participants" at 
all. Unfortunately, Koenig (2015) and 
Satyanath et al. (2017) do not go back to 
the original source of data (Statistisches 
Reichsamt 1933), but instead take Ade-
na et al.'s data uncritically and repeat the 
same mistake. These studies' non-fin-
dings regarding the impact of exposure 
to WWI violence on Weimar politics is 
therefore unsurprising.
Unlike most other post-conflict envi-
ronments, former Yugoslavia's successor 
states – and in particular Croatia – offer 
some of the best data for the study of 
the political legacies of war. The wars in 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Kosovo have been arguably the most 
documented conflicts since World War 
II, with a wealth of archival and statisti-
cal sources generated by the various 
domestic and international legal insti-
tutions, bureaus of statistics, as well as 
organisations of the civil sector. What is 
especially important to note is that new 
sources and new data are still being ge-
nerated and distilled for the interested 
public, particularly when it comes to 
the often-competing efforts of several 
organisations in compiling the lists of 
war dead. If we use the aforementioned 
classification of war legacy aggregate-le-
vel data into five groups, we can say 
that Croatia, for example, on the level 
of its 556 municipalities: 1) has publicly 
available data for population displace-
ment; 2) has publicly available data for 
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war-related disability; 3) will eventually 
have publicly available data for civilian 
and military deaths on both sides of the 
conflict; 4) has publicly unavailable data 
for veterans; and 5) has very limited and 
flawed data on physical destruction.
When it comes to population displa-
cement data, the Croatian government 
tracked the movements of displaced 
persons – primarily Croats expelled 
from occupied territories, as well as re-
fugees coming from Bosnia and Herze-
govina – throughout the war reasonably 
well, considering the circumstances. In 
the immediate post-war period, several 
government publications summarised 
those figures (e.g. Uprava za progna-
nike i izbjeglice, 1995), though their 
calculations must be treated cautiously 
due to various reporting problems. The 
two post-war censuses, however, offer a 
much better and more reliable alternati-
ve. In the 2001 census, the Croatian Bu-
reau of Statistics recorded information 
on individuals' reasons for migration, 
with one category being "war" in the pe-
riod between 1991 and 2001. The 2011 
census unfortunately abandoned this 
terminology and instead opted for the 
category of "forced migration", rende-
ring the two figures not fully compara-
ble, though both very useful. Disability 
figures from the two censuses, on the 
other hand, are comparable. Disaggre-
gated by causes of physical or mental 
disability, with one of the causes being 
the 1991-1995 war, they offer arguably 
Figure 2. Modelling the consequences of war violence in Croatian municipalitiesFigure 2. Modelling the consequences of war vi le ce in Croatian municipalities 
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the best insight into the surviving popu-
lation's exposure to war violence.
Data on deaths and the loss of physi-
cal capital in the Croatian war, however, 
are not as reliable. That is particularly 
the case when it comes to the data on 
actual physical destruction. The gover-
nment did conduct estimates of physi-
cal destruction throughout the war and 
in the immediate post-war period in 
concert with the promulgation of the 
Reconstruction Law (Zastupnički dom, 
1996). The housing stock damages were, 
however, estimated only on the level of 
counties and the methodology used, as 
well as the real and obvious obstacles, do 
not suggest we can have full confidence 
in those figures (Vlada, 1998). Unfortu-
nately, housing stock census data is also 
of little help due to limited descripti-
veness of the categories used. Data on 
war deaths is in somewhat better shape, 
with substantial improvements to come 
in the short- to medium-term with the 
progress in the completion of the lists 
of war dead by several non-governmen-
tal institutions, as well as the Croatian 
Memorial and Documentation Centre 
of Homeland War (HMDCDR) which 
has arguably come the furthest in this 
effort, though its work is still incomple-
te. Aggregate-level data on war veterans, 
on the other hand, exists only on the le-
vel of Croatia's 21 counties (Šućur et al. 
2017) and with the recent closing of the 
Registry of War Veterans to the public 
through the new Law on War Veterans 
(Hrvatski Sabor 2017), that is likely to 
remain the case unless there is a change 
of policy or a change of government.
Our Figure 2 shows four of the afo-
rementioned variables on the map of 
Croatia's municipalities. Their analytical 
potential is immediately apparent. The 
displacement figures in the upper left 
map, which are based on the 2011 census 
data on "forced migration", highlight the 
geographically uneven influx of former 
refugees, particularly into Western Sla-
vonia. The most notable feature of the 
war disability figures in the upper right 
map, on the other hand, is how the most 
affected areas closely follow the frontli-
ne areas of direct combat, further con-
firming that this may be the best proxy 
for the actual exposure of the surviving 
population to war violence. The bottom 
two maps, on the other hand, show the 
still incomplete figures for dead military 
personnel on both sides of the conflict, 
acquired from HMDCDR. Soldiers who 
died on the Croatian side came from ne-
arly all Croatian regions, though dispro-
portionately less from Istria, northern 
Croatia, and obviously the regions with 
Serb pre-war majorities. On the other 
hand, soldiers who died on the side of 
the rebel Krajina Serbs came exclusively 
from the areas where the Serbs consti-
tuted a majority or significant minority. 
Although in 1991 Serbs lived througho-
ut the whole of Croatia, the soldiers who 
died on the side of the rebel Krajina Serbs 
came from only 107 out of 556 munici-
palities. Apart from Osijek, almost none 
of them came from larger urban areas, 
signifying to which extent the rebellion 
was territorially determined and to whi-
ch extent it divided not only Croatia, but 
also the Croatian Serb community.
In spite of the available data's shortco-
mings and the limitations of conducting 
aggregate-level research, we believe sc-
holars of all social sciences in the regi-
on could and should make better use of 
these resources in their analyses. They 
have the potential of not only helping us 
answer region-specific puzzles – from 
the nature of political competition to 
the patterns of post-war economic de-
velopment – but also shedding light on 
great theoretical and conceptual deba-
tes of our disciplines. Wars are, indeed, 
unevenly distributed social events. Their 
legacies echo in space and time – once 
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again, unevenly – for generations after 
the violence has ended.
Conclusions
As this review has shown, modelling the 
consequences of war violence is a com-
plex endeavour. The lack of uniformity 
in the literature is hardly surprising con-
sidering the fact that wars have a multi-
tude of effects on individuals, instituti-
ons, and communities. These effects are 
often both highly context specific and 
simply not captured by either publicly 
collected data or conventional public 
opinion research. However, if we are to 
make progress – theoretically and empi-
rically – in this very promising field and 
if we are to reach portable conclusions 
with strong comparative reach, some 
order needs to be brought to our efforts 
at capturing the legacies of war. This 
was indeed the purpose of this article. It 
was an attempt to organise, categorise, 
and evaluate the different approaches at 
modelling the consequences of war vi-
olence, particularly in studies of voters, 
parties, and electoral competition.
We structured our argumentation 
around three levels of analysis: indivi-
dual level of voters, institutional level of 
political parties, and the aggregate level 
of communities. Our discussion hope-
fully offered a number of insights, but 
we believe the following three should be 
particularly highlighted. First, the study 
of the impact of legacies of war on po-
litical behaviour on the individual level 
faces two challenges: the appropriate 
modelling of the individuals' different 
dimensions of possible war-related psy-
chological distress (which are related to, 
but distinct from, direct and indirect 
war experiences), and the design of stu-
dies which go beyond conventional pu-
blic opinion research in order to allow 
for better causal inference. Second, in 
the pursuit for a systematic and abun-
dant stream of evidence regarding the 
evolution of war legacies in the acti-
vities of political parties and political 
entrepreneurs, the text as data approa-
ch offers arguably the greatest promise. 
Recent software and hardware advances 
already enable us to trace the reflections 
of war histories in our discourse, as well 
as their effects on how the past becomes 
embedded in the present. The main task 
is to build appropriate corpora and to 
continuously make theoretical innovati-
ons which can enable us to make sense 
of it all. And third, the modelling of war 
legacies on the aggregate level has the 
potential of helping us revise some long-
held views in the scholarship on politi-
cal cleavages and electoral competition. 
The challenge is, of course, in generating 
reliable and comparable aggregate-level 
data across different historical and tem-
poral contexts.
Although we structured our discussi-
on around the three levels of analysis, 
this should not distract from the task 
of making meaningful connections 
among them. The supply and demand 
sides of the political market are close-
ly interwoven and can only be properly 
understood in tandem. We also believe 
that the lessons from our three levels 
of analysis have one important thing 
in common: the implication that, if we 
are to make empirically solid advance-
ments, we need to engage in constructi-
ve dialogue across disciplinary divides. 
The political science modelling of war 
legacies cannot move forward without 
employing the newest developments in 
psychology, economics, history, lingui-
stics, sociology. Wars are complex social 
events. Grasping their effects is an equ-
ally complex endeavour. Nevertheless, 
it is imperative that we pursue it. Many 
post-war societies – particularly those 
in Southeast Europe – are continuously 
reliving their pasts. Understanding why 
that is the case is the first step in chan-
ging it.
 
95
 
J. 
G
la
ur
di
ć,
 C
h.
 L
es
sc
ha
ev
e,
 M
. M
oc
ht
ak
, M
od
el
lin
g 
th
e 
le
ga
ci
es
 o
f w
ar
 v
io
le
nc
e:
 V
ot
er
s,
 p
ar
tie
s,
 c
om
m
un
iti
es
, A
na
li 
15
 (1
) 7
7-
10
1 
(2
01
8)
References
Adena, Maja, Enikolopov, Ruben, Pe-
trova, Maria, Santarosa, Veronica, 
Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina. 2015. Radio 
and the rise of the Nazis in prewar 
Germany. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics. (130) 4: 1885-1939.
Allam, Miriam S., Goerres, Achim. 
2011. Economics, politics or identi-
ties? Explaining individual support 
for the Euro in new EU member states 
in Central and Eastern Europe. Eu-
rope-Asia Studies. (63) 8: 1399-1424.
Althaus, Scott L., Bramlett, Brittany H., 
Gimpel, James G. 2012. When war 
hits home: The geography of military 
losses and support for war in time and 
space. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 
(56) 3: 382-412.
Baker, Kendall L., Dalton, Russell J., Hi-
ldebrandt, Kai. 1981. Germany Trans-
formed. Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press.
Barnes, Samuel H. 1967. Party Democ-
racy: Politics in an Italian Socialist 
Federation. New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press.
Basedau, Matthias, Moroff, Anika. 2011. 
Parties in chains: Do ethnic party 
bans in Africa promote peace? Party 
Politics. (17) 2: 205-222.
Baturo, Alexander, Dasandi, Niheer, 
Mikhaylov, Slava J. 2017. What drives 
the international development agen-
da? An NLP analysis of the United 
Nations general debate 1970-2016. 
In 2017 International Conference 
on the Frontiers and Advances in 
Data Science, 1–6. http://arxiv.org/
abs/1708.05873.
Biezen, Ingrid van. 2004. Political par-
ties as public utilities. Party Politics. 
(10) 6: 701-722.
Bille, Lars. 2001. Democratizing a dem-
ocratic procedure: Myth or reality? 
Party Politics. (7) 3: 363-380.
Blattman, Christopher. 2009. From vio-
lence to voting: War and political par-
ticipation in Uganda. American Polit-
ical Science Review. (103) 2: 231-247.
Brakman, Steven, Garretsen, Harry, 
Schramm, Marc. 2004. The strategic 
bombing of German cities during 
World War II and its impact on city 
growth. Journal of Economic Geogra-
phy. (4) 2: 201-218.
Bucciol, Alessandro, Zarri, Luca. 2015. 
The shadow of the past: Financial risk 
taking and negative life events. Jour-
nal of Economic Psychology. (48): 1-16.
Cameron, Lisa, Shah, Manisha. 2015. 
Risk-taking behavior in the wake of 
natural disasters. Journal of Human 
Resources. (50) 2: 484-515.
Canetti, Daphna et al. 2017. Exposure 
to violence, ethos of conflict, and su-
pport for compromise: Surveys in 
Israel, East Jerusalem, West Bank, and 
Gaza. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 
(61) 1: 84-113.
Canetti-Nisim, Daphna et al. 2009. A 
new stress-based model of politi-
cal extremism: Personal exposure to 
terrorism, psychological distress, and 
exclusionist political attitudes. Journal 
of Conflict Resolution. (53) 3: 363-389.
Carson, Jamie L., Jenkins, Jefferey A., 
Rohde, David W., Souva, Mark A. 
2001. The impact of national tides 
and district-level effects on electoral 
outcomes: The U.S. congressional ele-
ctions of 1862-63. American Journal of 
Political Science. (45) 4: 887-898.
CHESDATA. 2018. Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey. https://www.chesdata.eu/.
Crawford, Beverly, Lijphart, Arend. 
1995. Explaining political and eco-
nomic change in post-communist 
Eastern Europe. Comparative Political 
Studies. (28) 2: 171-199.
 
96
 
a
na
li 
h
rv
at
sk
og
 p
ol
iti
ol
oš
ko
g 
dr
uš
tv
a 
20
18
.
Crowley, Jocelyn Elise, Watson, Marga-
ret, Waller, Maureen R. 2008. Under-
standing "power talk": Language, pub-
lic policy, and democracy. Perspectives 
on Politics. (6) 1: 71-88.
Davis, Donald R. Weinstein, David E. 
2002. Bones, bombs and breakpoints: 
The geography of economic activity. 
American Economic Review. (92) 5: 
1269-1289.
Della Vigna, Stefano, Enikolopov, Ru-
ben, Mironova, Vera, Petrova, Maria, 
Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina. 2014. Cro-
ss-border media and nationalism: Evi-
dence from Serbian radio in Croatia. 
American Economic Journal: Applied 
Economics. (6) 3: 103-132.
Dewan, Torun, Squintani, Francesco. 
2016. In defense of factions. American 
Journal of Political Science. (60) 4: 860-
881.
Dyrstad, Karin. 2012. After ethnic civil 
war: Ethno-nationalism in the We-
stern Balkans. Journal of Peace Re-
search. (49) 6: 817-831.
Dyrstad, Karin. 2013. Does civil war 
breed authoritarian values? An em-
pirical study of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Kosovo and Croatia. Democratization. 
(20) 7: 1219-1242.
Eckel, Catherine, El-Gamal, Mahmoud 
A., Wilson, Rick K. 2009. Risk loving 
after the storm: A Bayesian-network 
study of Hurricane Katrina evacuees. 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Or-
ganization. (69) 2: 110–124.
Gabel, Matthew J., Palmer, Harvey D. 
1995. Understanding variation in pu-
blic support for European integration. 
European Journal of Political Research. 
(27) 1: 3-19.
Gabel, Matthew J. Whitten, Guy D. 
1997. Economic conditions, econo-
mic perceptions, and public support 
for European integration. Political Be-
havior. (19) 1: 81-96.
Gadjanova, Elena. 2015. Measuring par-
ties' ethnic appeals in democracies. 
Party Politics. 21 (2): 309-327.
Gartner, Scott Sigmund. 2008. Ties to 
the dead: Connections to Iraq War 
and 9/11 casualties and disapproval of 
the president. American Sociological 
Review. (73) 4: 690-695.
Gartner, Scott Sigmund, Segura, Gary 
M., Wilkening, Michael. 1997. All po-
litics are local: Local losses and indi-
vidual attitudes toward the Vietnam 
War. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 
(41) 5: 669-694.
Glaurdić, Josip, Vuković, Vuk. 2015. 
Prosperity and peace: Economic in-
terests and war legacy in Croatia's EU 
referendum vote. European Union Pol-
itics. (16) 4: 577-600.
Glaurdić, Josip, Vuković, Vuk. 2016. 
Voting after war: Legacy of conflict 
and the economy as determinants of 
electoral support in Croatia. Electoral 
Studies. (42): 135-145.
Glaurdić, Josip, Vuković, Vuk. 2018. 
Post-war voters as fiscal liberals: local 
elections, spending, and war trauma 
in contemporary Croatia, East Euro-
pean Politics. (34) 2: 173-193
Goeke, Martin. 2016. Political stability 
and peace through party engineering: 
The case of Lesotho. Politikon. (43) 3: 
293-309.
Grossman, Guy, Manekin, Devorah, 
Miodownik, Dan. 2015. The political 
legacies of combat: Attitudes toward 
war and peace among Israeli ex-com-
batants. International Organization. 
(69) 4: 981-1009.
Hadzic, Dino, Carlson, David, Tavits, 
Margit. 2017. How exposure to violen-
ce affects ethnic voting. British Journal 
of Political Science. Online first.
Healy, Andrew, Malhotra, Neil. 2013. 
Retrospective voting reconsidered. 
Annual Review of Political Science. 16: 
285-306.
 
97
 
J. 
G
la
ur
di
ć,
 C
h.
 L
es
sc
ha
ev
e,
 M
. M
oc
ht
ak
, M
od
el
lin
g 
th
e 
le
ga
ci
es
 o
f w
ar
 v
io
le
nc
e:
 V
ot
er
s,
 p
ar
tie
s,
 c
om
m
un
iti
es
, A
na
li 
15
 (1
) 7
7-
10
1 
(2
01
8)
Hershey, Marjorie R. 2017. Party Politics 
in America. New York: Routledge.
Hirsch-Hoefler, Sivan et al. 2016. Confli-
ct will harden your heart: Exposure to 
violence, psychological distress, and 
peace barriers in Israel and Palestine. 
British Journal of Political Science. (46) 
4: 845-859.
Hrvatski sabor. 2017. Zakon o hrvatskim 
braniteljima iz Domovinskog rata i 
članovima njihovih obitelji. Narodne 
novine. 121/2017.
Ishiyama, John. 2014. Civil wars and 
party systems. Social Science Quarter-
ly. (95) 2: 425-447.
Ishiyama, John, Marshall, Michael C. 
2015. Candidate recruitment and for-
mer rebel parties. Party Politics. (21) 
4: 591-602.
Itzkovitch-Malka, Reut, Hazan, Reuven 
Y. 2017. Unpacking party unity: The 
combined effects of electoral systems 
and candidate selection methods on 
legislative attitudes and behavioural 
norms. Political Studies. (65) 2: 452-
474.
Jarstad, Anna K., Sisk, Timothy D. 2008. 
From War to Democracy: Dilemmas 
of Peacebuilding. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Jennings, M. Kent, Markus, Gregory B. 
1977. The effect of military service 
on political attitudes: A panel study. 
American Political Science Review. 
(71) 1: 131-147.
Karol, David, Miguel, Edward. 2007. The 
electoral cost of war: Iraq casualties 
and the 2004 U.S. presidential electi-
on. Journal of Politics. (69) 3: 633-648.
Katz, Richard S., Crotty, William J. 2014. 
Handbook of Party Politics. Los Ange-
les: Sage.
Khazen, Farid el. 2003. Political parties 
in postwar Lebanon: parties in search 
of partisans. Middle East Journal. (57) 
4: 605-624.
Kijewski, Sara, Freitag, Markus. 2018. 
Civil war and the formation of social 
trust in Kosovo: Posttraumatic growth 
or war-related distress? Journal of 
Conflict Resolution. (62) 4: 717-742.
Kim, Young-il, Lee, Jungmin. 2014. The 
long-run impact of a traumatic expe-
rience on risk aversion. Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization. 
(108): 174-186.
Kitschelt, Herbert, Mansfeldova, Zden-
ka, Markowski, Radoslaw, Tóka, 
Gábor. 1999. Post-Communist Party 
Systems: Competition, Representation, 
and Inter-party Cooperation. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Klingler, Jonathan D., Chatagnier, J. 
Tyson. 2014. Are you doing your 
part? Veterans' political attitudes and 
Heinlein's conception of citizenship. 
Armed Forces & Society. (40) 4: 673-
695.
Koenig, Christoph. 2015. Loose cannons 
– War veterans and the erosion of de-
mocracy in Weimar Germany. War-
wick Economics Research Paper Series, 
No. 1079.
Kostadinova, Tatiana. 2000. East Eu-
ropean public support for NATO 
membership: Fears and aspirations. 
Journal of Peace Research. (37) 2: 235-
249.
Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. Where's the par-
ty? British Journal of Political Science. 
(23) 2: 235-266.
Kriner, Douglas L., Shen, Francis X. 
2007. Iraq casualties and the 2006 
Senate elections. Legislative Studies 
Quarterly. (32) 4: 507-530.
Kriner, Douglas L., Shen, Francis X. 
2012. How citizens respond to combat 
casualties: The differential impact of 
local casualties on support for the war 
in Afghanistan. Public Opinion Quar-
terly. (76) 4: 761-770.
Kriner, Douglas, L., Shen, Francis X. 
2014. Responding to war on Capitol 
 
98
 
a
na
li 
h
rv
at
sk
og
 p
ol
iti
ol
oš
ko
g 
dr
uš
tv
a 
20
18
.
Hill: Battlefield casualties, congressio-
nal response, and public support for 
the war in Iraq. American Journal of 
Political Science. (58) 1: 157-174.
Lehmann, Pola, Lewandowski, Jirka, 
Matthieß, Theres, Merz, Nicolas, Re-
gel, Sven, Werner, Annika. 2017. Man-
ifesto Corpus. Version: 2017-1. Berlin: 
WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
Lesschaeve, Christophe, Glaurdić, Josip. 
2018. ELWar Expert Survey. Version 
1.0. Available at elwar.uni.lu. Luxem-
bourg: University of Luxembourg.
Lipset, Seymour M., Rokkan, Ste-
in. 1967. Cleavage structures, party 
systems, and voter alignments: An 
introduction. In Lipset, Seymour M., 
Rokkan, Stein (eds.). Party Systems 
and Voter Alignments: Cross-national 
Perspectives. New York: Free Press, pp. 
1-64.
Lyons, Terrence. 2016. From victorious 
rebels to strong authoritarian parties: 
Prospects for post-war democratiza-
tion. Democratization. (23) 6: 1026-
1041.
Mair, Peter. (ed.) 1990. The West Europe-
an Party System. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Mair, Peter. 2004. Party System Change: 
Approaches and Interpretation. Party 
System Change: Approaches and Inter-
pretation. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Malmendier, Ulrike, Nagel, Stefan. 2011. 
Depression babies: Do macroeco-
nomic experiences affect risk taking? 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. (126) 
1: 373-416.
Manning, Carrie. 2008. The Making of 
Democrats. New York: Palgrave Mac-
millan.
Manning, Carrie, Smith, Ian. 2016. 
Political party formation by former 
armed opposition groups after civil 
war. Democratization. (23) 6: 972-989.
Marshall, Michael C. 2017. Foreign rebel 
sponsorship. A patron–client analysis 
of party viability in elections follow-
ing negotiated settlements. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution. Online First.
Marshall, Michael C., Ishiyama, John. 
2016. Does political inclusion of rebel 
parties promote peace after civil con-
flict? Democratization. (23) 6: 1009-
1025.
Massey, Garth, Hodson, Randy, Sekulic, 
Dusko. 2003. Nationalism, liberalism 
and liberal nationalism in post-war 
Croatia. Nations and Nationalism. (9) 
1: 55-82.
Matanock, Aila M. 2018. External en-
gagement: explaining the spread of 
electoral participation provisions in 
civil conflict settlements. Internation-
al Studies Quarterly. (62) 3: 656-670.
Miguel, Edward, Gérard Roland. 2011. 
The long-run impact of bombing 
Vietnam. Journal of Development Eco-
nomics. (96) 1: 1-15.
Montalvo, José. 2011. Voting after the 
bombings: A natural experiment on 
the effect of terrorist attacks on demo-
cratic elections. Review of Economics 
and Statistics. (93) 4:1146-1154.
Nenadović, Maja. 2010. An uneasy sym-
biosis: The impact of international 
administrations on political parties in 
post-conflict countries. Democratiza-
tion. (17) 6: 1153-1175.
Proksch, Sven-Oliver, Slapin, Jonathan 
B. 2015. The Politics of Parliamentary 
Debate: Parties, Rebels and Represen-
tation. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Ramsbotham, Oliver, Woodhouse, Tom, 
Miall, Hugh. 2016. Contemporary 
Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, 
Management and Transformation of 
Deadly Conflicts. Cambridge: Polity 
Press.
Reilly, Benjamin. 2001. Democracy in 
Divided Societies: Electoral Engineer-
 
99
 
J. 
G
la
ur
di
ć,
 C
h.
 L
es
sc
ha
ev
e,
 M
. M
oc
ht
ak
, M
od
el
lin
g 
th
e 
le
ga
ci
es
 o
f w
ar
 v
io
le
nc
e:
 V
ot
er
s,
 p
ar
tie
s,
 c
om
m
un
iti
es
, A
na
li 
15
 (1
) 7
7-
10
1 
(2
01
8)
ing for Conflict Management. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reilly, Benjamin. 2006. Democracy and 
Diversity: Political Engineering in the 
Asia-Pacific. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Reilly, Benjamin. 2008. Post-war elec-
tions: Uncertain turning points of 
transition. In Jarstad, Anna K., Sisk, 
Timothy D. (eds.) From War to De-
mocracy:  Dilemmas of Peacebuilding. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 157-181.
Reilly, Benjamin, Nordlund, Per. 2008. 
Political Parties in Conflict-Prone So-
cieties: Regulation, Engineering and 
Democratic Development. New York: 
United Nations University Press.
Rohrschneider, Robert, Whitefield, 
Stephen. 2009. Understanding clea-
vages in party systems: Issue position 
and issue salience in 13 post-commu-
nist democracies. Comparative Politi-
cal Studies. (42) 2: 280-313.
Rozenas, Arturas, Schutte, Sebastian, 
Zhukov, Yuri. 2017. The political lega-
cy of violence: The long-term impact 
of Stalin's repression in Ukraine. Jour-
nal of Politics. 79(4): 1147-1161.
Sacco, Katiuscia, Galletto, Valentina, 
Blanzieri, Enrico. 2003. How has the 
9/11 terrorist attack influenced decisi-
on making? Applied Cognitive Psychol-
ogy. (17): 1113-1127.
Sandovici, Maria Elena, Listhaug, Ola. 
2012. Expectations about the present 
and future of Bosnia-Herzegovina: 
Optimism or pessimism? In: Simkus, 
Albert and Ringdal, Kirsten. (eds.). 
The Aftermath of War: Experiences 
and Social Attitudes in the Western 
Balkans. Burlington: Ashgate, pp. 257-
268.
Satyanath, Shanker, Voigtländer, Nico, 
Voth, Hand-Joachim. 2017. Bowling 
for fascism: Social capital and the rise 
of the Nazi Party. Journal of Political 
Economy. (125) 2: 478-526.
Schonhardt-Bailey, Cheryl. 2005. Mea-
suring ideas more effectively: An 
analysis of Bush and Kerry's national 
security speeches. PS: Political Science 
& Politics. (38) 4: 701-711.
Schreiber, E. M. 1979. Enduring effects 
of military service? Opinion differen-
ces between U.S. veterans and nonve-
terans. Social Forces. (57) 3: 824-839.
Simkus, Albert. 2007. South East Eu-
ropean Social Survey Project (SEE-
SSP), funded by the Western Balkan 
program of the Research Council of 
Norway, grant no. 144826/S30.
Sindre, Gyda Marås. 2016. Internal par-
ty democracy in former rebel parties. 
Party Politics. (22) 4: 501-511.
Solomon, Zahava, Lavi, Tamar. 2005. 
Israeli youth in the Second Intifada: 
PTSD and future orientation. Journal 
of the American Academy of Child & 
Adolescent Psychiatry. (44) 11: 1167-
1175.
Statistisches Reichsamt. 1933. Die öffen-
tliche Fürsorge im Deutschen Reich in 
den Rechnungsjahren 1927 bis 1931. 
Statistik des Deutschen Reichs. Band 
421.
Strabac, Zan, Ringdal, Kristen. 2008. 
Individual and contextual influences 
of war on ethnic prejudice in Croatia. 
Sociological Quarterly. (49) 4: 769-
796.
Šućur, Zoran, Babić, Zdenko, Ogresta, 
Jelena. 2017. Demografska i socioekon-
omska obilježja hrvatskih branitelja. 
Zagreb: Ministarstvo hrvatskih brani-
telja i Državni zavod za statistiku.
Taleski, Dane. 2012. Within state-build-
ing: Studying parties from guerrillas 
in Croatia and Macedonia. Südoste-
uropa. Zeitschrift für Politik und Ge-
sellschaft. (60) 4: 536-544.
Teigen, Jeremy M. 2006. Enduring effe-
cts of the uniform: Previous military 
 
10
0 
a
na
li 
h
rv
at
sk
og
 p
ol
iti
ol
oš
ko
g 
dr
uš
tv
a 
20
18
.
experience and voting turnout. Politi-
cal Research Quarterly. (59) 4: 601-607.
Teigen, Jeremy. 2007. Veterans' party 
identification, candidate affect, and 
vote choice in the 2004 U.S. presiden-
tial election. Armed Forces & Society. 
(33) 3: 414-437.
Thomson, Henry. 2018. Grievances, 
mobilization, and mass opposition 
to authoritarian regimes: A subnati-
onal analysis of East Germany's 1953 
abbreviated revolution. Comparative 
Political Studies. (51) 12: 1594-1627.
Tucker, Joshua A. 2006. Regional eco-
nomic voting. Russia, Poland, Hunga-
ry, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, 
1990-1999. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Uprava za prognanike i izbjeglice. 1995. 
Prognanici i izbjeglice u Republici Hr-
vatskoj. Zagreb: Vlada Republike Hr-
vatske.
Vlada Republike Hrvatske. 1998. Nasta-
vak obnove ratom stradalih područja. 
Narodne novine. 159/1998.
Vonyó, Tamás. 2012. The bombing of 
Germany: The economic geography 
of war-induced dislocation in West 
German industry. European Review of 
Economic History. (16) 97-118.
Voors, Maarten J., Nillesen, Eleonora E. 
M., Verwimp, E. Philip, Bulte, Erwin 
H., Lensink, Robert, Van Soest, Daan 
P. 2012. Violent conflict and behavior: 
A field experiment in Burundi. Amer-
ican Economic Review. (102) 2: 941-
964.
Waldinger, Fabian. 2016. Bombs, bra-
ins, and science: The role of human 
and physical capital for the creation of 
scientific knowledge. Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics. (98) 5: 811-831.
Whiting, Sophie. 2016. Mainstream rev-
olutionaries: Sinn Féin as a 'normal' 
political party? Terrorism and Political 
Violence. (28) 3: 541-560.
Witmer, Frank D. W., O'Loughlin, John. 
2009. Satellite data methods and 
application in the evaluation of war 
outcomes: Abandoned agricultural 
land in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the 
1992-1995 conflict. Annals of the As-
sociation of American Geographers. 
(99) 5: 1033-1044.
Zastupnički dom Republike Hrvat-
ske. 1996. Zakon o obnovi. Narodne 
novine. 24/1996.
Zeeuw, Jeroen de. 2008. From Soldiers to 
Politicians: Transforming Rebel Move-
ments after Civil War. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner.
 
10
1 
J. 
G
la
ur
di
ć,
 C
h.
 L
es
sc
ha
ev
e,
 M
. M
oc
ht
ak
, M
od
el
lin
g 
th
e 
le
ga
ci
es
 o
f w
ar
 v
io
le
nc
e:
 V
ot
er
s,
 p
ar
tie
s,
 c
om
m
un
iti
es
, A
na
li 
15
 (1
) 7
7-
10
1 
(2
01
8)
Modeliranje naslijeđa ratnog nasilja:  
birači, stranke, zajednice
Sažetak ratovi su ekstremni događaji koji ostavljaju duboke socijalne posljedice. 
politička znanost ima ograničen uvid u njihov utjecaj na prirodu i sadržaj političkog 
natjecanja neposredno nakon što se završe. djelomice je tako zato što nedostaje 
pojmovna jasnoća u evidentiranju posljedica rata pomoću pouzdanih podataka. u 
ovome članku usustavljuju se i vrednuju pokušaji modeliranja posljedica rata u po-
litološkim istraživanjima koja se temelje na kvantitativnim metodama. razmatranje 
je organizirano na trima analitičkim razinama: individualnoj razini birača, instituci-
onalnoj razini političkih stranaka i agregatnoj razini zajednica. posebnu pozornost 
posvećujemo modeliranju naslijeđa najrecentnijih ratova u Jugoistočnoj europi, a 
iznosimo i vlastito gledište o tome koja nastojanja imaju najveći potencijal da po-
mognu u stvaranju temelja obećavajućega istraživačkog programa.
Ključne riječi naslijeđa rata, postkonfliktna društva, izbori, birači, stranke, političko 
natjecanje

